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Executive Summary
The two recent macroeconomic shocks that hit the world economy - the surge of oil and 
food prices and the subprime crisis – have revived the attention of policy makers and 
economists on the consequences of shocks, symmetric and asymmetric, and on the 
appropriateness of the EMU institutional framework to respond to these shocks. The 
briefing paper outlines the doctrine that underlies the ECB response to the shock, i.e. an 
exclusive focus on inflation, and argues that this policy is likely to be ineffective, while 
it will certainly have deep distributional consequences, having the same analytical effect 
as of a regressive tax on low income wage earners. The paper then discusses in more 
general terms how the European institutions face difficulties in the classical 
instrument/objective assignment problem, which stems from an excess of confidence in 
market adjustment mechanisms. This contrasts with the case of the US, where market 
forces and policy interventions complement each other in a virtuous way. The paper 
then concludes with a number of proposed changes in the economic governance of 
Europe, which would make the policy reaction to shocks easier and more effective.
2In the past months two major sources of uncertainty loomed on the world economy. 
First, the recent turbulences on the financial markets, triggered by the subprime crisis,
whose effects seem not to be over, and are beginning to spill to the real sector through 
increased credit constraints and deteriorating private agents’ confidence. The second
element of uncertainty, even more dramatic, is the steep increase of food and raw 
materials prices1 that depends on both structural and contingent factors, and whose 
social consequences are causing increasing concern.
The combined macroeconomic effect of these two crises is quite visible. Growth 
forecasts for the years 2008-2009 are being revised downwards for most countries and 
economic zones, and the debate is still heated as of how lasting the effects of this twin 
crisis will be.
An important effect of this period of turbulence is the revived attention on the 
consequences of shocks on the economy, and on the appropriate policy responses. This 
is particularly important in the European Monetary Union, where the treaties have left a 
good deal of ambiguity in the objectives/instruments assignment. How to safeguard the 
general support in macroeconomic policies in general and in particular monetary policy 
during times of economic distress in a monetary union is hence a very relevant question. 
Monetary policy being the main federal policy of the EU, general support in it is crucial 
for its legitimacy. 
This moment of crisis becomes then an occasion to assess whether the current 
institutional framework of the EMU is appropriate to respond to the different types of 
shocks that hit the European economies, and to assess its effectiveness and credibility. 
This paper will at first outline the doctrine that lies behind the current European 
institutional framework, and then argue that while coherent, such framework may be 
inappropriate to respond to a number of shocks; in particular, in the current situation the 
policies followed by the European governments and by the ECB are likely to exacerbate 
the problems faced by the European economies, and by low income wage earners in 
particular. I will conclude that a more pragmatic approach is desirable, and that the 
example of the United States may prove helpful. 
                                               
1 The ECB forecasts international food prices to increase by 44% in 2008. See ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 12th
2008, p 81.
31. The Design of the Institutions for European Economic Governance
In my briefing paper of March 20072 I described at length the theoretical framework 
that influenced the creation of the Maastricht institutions. That discussion may be 
briefly summarized as follows:
1) Once public intervention has coped with externalities, clearing 
and complete markets that are populated by rational agents usually 
yield the best possible outcome in terms of resource allocation and 
growth.
2) When that is not the case, the responsibilities lie with frictions 
and market failures. 
3) The role of economic policy is then simply to remove or 
minimize these frictions on the supply side (through structural 
reforms and a reduction of government’s size).
4) Any active intervention on the demand side is useless, if not 
harmful. Once conditions on the supply side are established, the 
economy will attain the most efficient position unless distorted by 
public intervention.
5) This has important consequences in terms of policy: if tradeoffs 
do not exist, the policy maker is not confronted by choices, and there 
is no role for activist macroeconomic policies. Fixed rules are the 
preferred tool for conducting policy because they prevent biases in 
policy makers' actions and constitute an anchor for private 
expectations. Hence the search for price stability and the obedience to 
a fiscal rule (the SGP) is more than enough to take care of demand.
Coherently with this conclusion, the European institutional setup, de facto, gives up 
discretionary economic policy. Monetary policy is delegated to an independent 
monetary authority, the European Central Bank, which is not accountable to any 
political body. Fiscal policy is strongly constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which barely leaves space for automatic stabilizers to work.
Within this framework, whenever a shock hits the economy the bulk of the 
adjustment relies on market forces (wage and price flexibility, factor mobility, etc etc), 
while fiscal and especially monetary policy have a limited role. In particular, barring 
very particular cases monetary policy has to focus on its primary objective, inflation.
The almost exclusive focus on inflation explains the choice to focus on a headline 
inflation objective, that is to react to price increases even when they do not directly 
depend on domestic conditions. In the June 2008 ECB Monthly Bulletin, the ECB 
explains its strategy as follows:
“The Governing Council emphasises that maintaining price stability in the medium 
term is the ECB’s primary objective in accordance with its mandate. The Governing 
                                               
2 Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Wage Setting and Price Stability, Briefing paper prepared for the Committee For Economic 
and Monetary Affairs, no 2007-1, March 2007. The interested reader may also look at Fitoussi and Saraceno 
(forthcoming).
4Council is monitoring very closely all developments. It is in a state of heightened 
alertness. By acting in a firm and timely manner, the Governing Council will 
prevent second-round effects and ensure that risks to price stability over the medium 
term do not materialise. It is its strong determination to secure a firm anchoring of 
medium and long-term inflation expectations in line with price stability. […] 
Against this background [of increased oil and non energy commodity prices hikes,], 
it is imperative to secure that medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain 
firmly anchored in line with price stability. All parties concerned, in both the private 
and the public sector, must meet their responsibilities. Wage-setting needs to take 
into account productivity developments, the still high level of unemployment in many 
economies, and price competitiveness positions. Moderate labour cost increases are 
particularly necessary in countries which have lost price competitiveness in recent 
years. Broadly based second-round effects stemming from the impact of higher 
energy and food prices on price and wage-setting behaviour must be avoided. In 
this context, the Governing Council is concerned about the existence of schemes in 
which nominal wages are indexed to consumer prices. Such schemes involve the risk 
of upward shocks in inflation leading to a wage-price spiral, which would be 
detrimental to employment and competitiveness in the countries concerned. The 
Governing Council therefore calls for such schemes to be avoided.”3
To summarize, the ECB argues that it has to tighten its stance (or not to ease it, 
which during times of economic distress amounts to the same) in reaction to domestic 
and imported inflation pressures alike, because the latter risks triggering wage-price 
spirals (second-round effects). The possible deflationary effects of such a stance are not 
a major concern of the ECB, whose primary objective is price stability. This is in stark 
contrast with the US Fed, which has to balance the objective of price stability with the 
support to economic activity, and thus focuses on core inflation (excluding oil and food 
prices). The result of these two different views in the past months has been a significant 
drop of US interest rates (from 5.25% to 2%), while the ECB rate remained rock-steady 
at 4%.
2. The Dilemmas of Economic Policy in the Eurozone
The ECB theoretical framework, and the strategy that it follows coherently with this 
framework, are today running into two related dilemmas. The first is the one I already 
mentioned above, and that has been the subject of other briefing papers, between the 
inflation and growth objective. Only three months ago4, writing about the subprime 
crisis, I challenged the ECB explicit assumption, that inflation is always a monetary 
phenomenon, and that the interest rate instrument should be devoted exclusively to 
dealing with inflation pressures.
                                               
3 ECB Monthly Bulletin, 12 June 2008, pp. 4-5.
4  Jean-Paul Fitoussi, ECB Objectives and Tasks: Price Stability vs. Lender of Last Resort, Briefing paper 
prepared for the Committee For Economic and Monetary Affairs, no 2008-1, March 2008.
5The second dilemma, that is much less debated but at least as important as the first, 
is related to the redistributive effects of shocks and monetary policy’s reaction. The 
impact of the current shocks on prices is more important for low and fixed income 
categories, who spend a much larger share of their income in the goods that have seen 
their price explode (oil, primary goods, etc), and who are unable to transfer these 
increases on other categories.
As a consequence, the burden of these price increases falls disproportionately on the 
shoulders of low income categories, and these shocks are analytically equivalent to 
regressive tax increases. This explains why according to many surveys purchasing 
power is the main concern of households in many countries across Europe.
If we keep in mind this fact, the ECB argument that restrictive monetary policy 
should also be used against imported inflation in order to fight second round effects, 
acquires a new meaning. Acting as the watchdog of wages (the very last sentence of the 
citation above is revealing in this respect) the ECB controls inflation, but in doing so it 
exacerbates the redistributive effects of imported inflation that disproportionately 
affects low income categories. In other words, to avoid a price inflation spiral, the 
“external tax” due to the increase in oil prices in particular should be paid only by the 
wage earners. Then the decrease in purchasing power of the median worker would calm 
inflationary pressure helping the ECB to reach its inflation target. To that mechanism 
will cooperate also the decrease in purchasing power due to the increase in food prices.
Thus, inflation controls come at the price of an increasing income inequality, and 
depressed domestic aggregate demand, thus linking the two dilemmas in a vicious circle.
Furthermore, even abstracting from considerations about inequality and growth, we 
can raise doubts on the effectiveness of this strategy. Both the subprime crisis and the
oil and food price increases are shocks that hit the entire Euro zone, but whose effects 
are different in the different countries depending on a number of factors like the 
productive structure, the energy mix, the response of the labour market, the distribution 
of income, etc. While purely asymmetric shocks (e.g. a natural disaster, a social conflict) 
are much easier to identify and tackle, the real difficulty lies in the diagnosis of 
asymmetric effects of common shocks. Once again we can rely on simple textbook 
analysis to show that using the common monetary instrument to address country 
specific inflation problems is useless, so that it risks hampering the credibility of the 
institution.
The standard argument that the ECB opposes to these criticisms is that market 
forces would be able to take care of these asymmetric shocks through relative price and 
wage changes, migration etc. The International Policy Group that I coordinated at 
OFCE5 had already warned in the early 1990s, that even in the US, where cultural and 
economic obstacles are much lower than in the Euro zone, persistent differences across 
states would show that market mechanisms alone were not able to absorb shocks. Thus, 
we suggested that asymmetric shocks would result, in absence of policy reactions, in 
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6increased unemployment and labour market tensions, an argument that was further 
validated by the works of Blanchard and Katz (1992), and Decressin and Fatas (1995).
We can add a few further considerations on the inadequacy of market flexibility and 
structural reforms as the sole answers to asymmetric shocks. First they may result in 
competition among member states (for example tax competition), triggering a race to 
the bottom that risks hampering the solidarity among countries that was the basis of the 
European construction. Second, reforms are not implemented in one day. Measures 
aimed at increasing flexibility, especially in the labour markets, will most likely result 
in long transitions during which reforms may have countercyclical effect, exacerbating 
the effects of shocks.
Our Policy Group also suggested that, following a standard textbook analysis, the loss of 
monetary sovereignty linked to the EMU should be compensated by a reinforced fiscal 
autonomy, and that the European institutions in the making (that later resulted in the Stability 
and Growth Pact) were actually going in the opposite direction and did not adequately 
respond to the standard objective/instrument assignment. Thus, I could only observe with 
preoccupation the slow but inexorable drift of the European institutions toward a restrictive 
interpretation of the SGP that we observed in the past few months, with increased focus on the 
medium term objective of a balanced budget rather than on the ceiling of 3%. What is 
puzzling is the autonomous dynamic of the stability pact which despite reforms to allegedly 
increase its flexibility seems to become more and more rigid. The focus of the Commission is 
by now much less on the level of the deficit than on its medium term evolution towards zero! 
Many European economists are now advocating the introduction in national constitutions of a 
fiscal rule whose effect will be to constrain countries to obey the stability pact. Notice that 
outside Europe almost no economists, or politicians are pleading for such a move, and that 
inside Europe but mezzo voce many politicians are criticizing the stability pact. 
It is nevertheless reassuring that today, after a decade of policy inertia that was among the 
causes of disappointing macroeconomic performances for the Euro zone, we are asked to 
reconsider the issue of appropriate responses to macroeconomic shocks. I see this as an 
implicit acknowledgement that policy should be given a more active role.
3. What Institutions for a More Effective Economic Policy?
I see the main problem of the current institutional framework in its global coherence with 
a theoretical approach that confines macroeconomic policy to a marginal role in the 
management of the economy. In this respect, the US may serve as a model in that their 
institutions rely on the complementarities between market based adjustments and 
discretionary fiscal and monetary policy. Thus I would strongly argue in favour of a global
reappraisal of policy intervention.
For what concerns monetary policy, the present times of economic distress shed light on 
an essential problem, which is more or less hidden in normal circumstances: the political 
nature of monetary policy decision. We have seen that monetary policy affects four variables 
7which usually are considered as primary objectives of any government: inflation, growth (and 
thus employment), the degree of inequalities, and through exchange rate variations the 
external balances. (And I skip wealth which is obviously affected by the rate of interest). A 
robust result in economics is that when an instrument is used to reach several objectives, the 
policy maker has to make trade-offs. In a democratic regime, trade-offs have to be made by 
the elected representatives of the population: they imply political choices and thus political 
responsibility. They can’t be left to a technocratic body. It may well be that a government 
proceeds exactly to the same choices than those of the ECB, but it will then bear full 
responsibility for this choice. 
In saying that, I am not criticizing the ECB. It has indeed no other choice than fulfilling its 
mandate which has been politically designed. But one has not to be an expert to understand 
that in making it such a way that a “technocratic body” has to bear responsibility for a 
political choice, it may loose its legitimacy. These remarks belabour the obvious which is that 
full responsibility can only be born by the political structure, and that “independent body” 
have to be accountable. 
As for fiscal policy, while maintaining some form of peer pressure to avoid free riding and 
spillovers within the EMU, I strongly argue for a renewed role of discretion for governments 
that already lost the monetary instrument with the Euro. Scrapping the objective of a balanced 
budget over the cycle, introducing some form of golden rule of the type implemented in the 
UK, increasing the number of exceptions to the 3% ceiling, or raising the ceiling altogether, 
are all measures that would allow European governments to recover some room for policy in 
their action.
To better deal with asymmetric shocks a solidarity fund could be envisioned, to which 
countries would contribute in good times.
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